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1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tony Curtis Sallings appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he presented a material issue of fact 
regarding the effectiveness of his trial counsel. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In his underlying criminal case, the state charged Sallings with delivery of 
methamphetamine.  (42424 R., p.47.)  The case proceeded to trial (see 42424 Trial Tr., 
pp.4-309), following which the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge (42424 R., 
p.106).  The district court entered judgment against Sallings and sentenced him to a 
unified term of six years with one year fixed.  (42424 R., pp.128-29.)  Because he failed 
to file an appeal from that judgment,1 it became final on July 11, 2014. 
On June 8, 2015, Sallings filed his timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, 
in which he claimed his trial counsel had been ineffective.  (R., pp.6-64.)  The state filed 
a motion for summary dismissal on the grounds that Sallings had failed to support his 
allegations with admissible evidence, and that his unsupported allegations failed to 
meet the Strickland2 standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel.  (R., pp.91-
92.)  Through appointed counsel, Sallings filed supplemental affidavits and a brief 
opposing the state’s motion, in which he clarified the grounds of his claims, alleging that 
his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to impeach the confidential informant, Tamara 
                                            
1  While Sallings did file a Rule 35 motion, and an appeal from the district court’s 
subsequent denial of that motion, that appeal cannot serve as an appeal from the 
judgment.  State v. Mosqueda, 123 Idaho 858, 859, 853 P.2d 603, 604 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
2  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Bowdoin; (2) failing to impeach all police officer testimony; (3) failing to file certain 
pretrial motions; and (4) failing to object to a redacted audio.  (R., pp.122-42.)   
The state responded with a renewed motion for summary dismissal on the 
grounds that most claims in the petition did not comply with Idaho Code § 19-4903, and 
that the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unsupported by sufficient 
evidence to meet the Strickland standard.  (R., pp.147-51.)  The district court granted 
the state’s motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.164-66), and Sallings filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R., pp.159-60). 
 
3 
ISSUE 
Sallings states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
Mr. Sallings’ petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Sallings failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
 
 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Sallings Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
In his post-conviction petition, Sallings raised several interrelated claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  (See R., pp.6-64, 122-42.)  The state sought 
summary dismissal on the grounds that most of the petition did not comply with the 
specificity requirements of Idaho Code § 19-4903, and that Sallings’ claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel failed to raise evidence of either prong of the United States 
Supreme Court’s standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
(R., pp.91-92, 147-51.)  The district court granted the state’s motion.  (R., pp.164-66.)  
On appeal, Sallings narrows his argument and asserts that the district court erred by 
dismissing his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because, he 
claims, trial counsel failed to cross-examine the state’s confidential informant, Tamara 
Bowdoin, in relation to an alleged theft.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-12.)  Application of the 
correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows that summary 
dismissal was appropriate. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
….”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Sallings’ Post-Conviction Petition 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).  Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief.  Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).  However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the “application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1).”  Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).  
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that “specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief on the trial court’s own initiative or in response to a party’s motion.  “To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a 
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claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal “if the applicant’s 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s 
claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.  While a court must accept a petitioner’s 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.  Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  “Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he must show that his attorney’s performance was objectively deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).  To establish deficient 
performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s 
performance was adequate and “show that his attorney’s conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”  Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 177 P.3d 362, 368 
(2008) (citations omitted).  “[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed 
on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.”  Id.  To establish 
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prejudice, the petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s 
deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. 
The district court granted the state’s renewed motion for summary dismissal, 
which was based on the grounds that many of Sallings’ claims lacked the specificity 
demanded by Idaho Code § 19-4903 (which does not appear to be disputed on appeal), 
and that Sallings’ remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were 
unsupported by sufficient evidence to satisfy the Strickland standard.  (R., pp.147-51; 
see also Tr., p.5, L.6 – p.11, L.22.)  On appeal, Sallings focuses his argument on his 
attorney’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing to impeach Ms. Bowdoin’s credibility during 
cross-examination with evidence that she may have stolen some of Sallings’ property 
while he was incarcerated.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9.)  Sallings’ argument fails.   
At the post-conviction stage below, Sallings’ argument in relation to counsel’s 
impeachment of Ms. Bowdoin was very broad, including an assertion that his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to call witnesses who could show that Ms. Bowdoin had stolen 
his property.  (See R., pp.28, 126.)  Calling at least one of those witnesses appears to 
have been trial counsel’s anticipated method of impeachment.  (42424 Trial Tr., p.89, 
Ls.5-23; p.91, Ls.12-20.)  However, ruling on the state’s motion in limine, the district 
court specifically foreclosed that strategy.  (Id., p.95, L.24 – p.97, L.13.)  In dismissing 
Sallings’ claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to impeach Ms. Bowdoin with 
evidence of an alleged theft, the court noted at the hearing on the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal that the trial court had made an in limine ruling, and trial counsel 
adhered to that ruling.  (Tr., p.8, L.18 – p.9, L.10.)  Adhering to the rulings of the district 
court does not show deficient performance. 
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On appeal, Sallings notes that the court’s ruling “clearly authorized trial counsel 
to engage in that line of cross-examination.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)  And Sallings is 
correct.  (See 42424 Trial Tr., p.96, L.21 – p.97, L.13.)  During the hearing on the 
motion in limine, trial counsel also requested, in lieu of calling witnesses, at least the 
opportunity to ask about the alleged theft on cross-examination of Ms. Bowdoin.  (42424 
Trial Tr., p.92, Ls.17-25.)  The district court granted that request.  (Id., p.97, Ls.5-9.)  But 
choosing not to pursue that particular line of questioning during cross-examination, 
contrary to Sallings’ assertions on appeal, does not show deficient performance. 
Whether and how to cross-examine a witness—whether and how to impeach that 
witness—are strategic decisions and, as noted above, such decisions will not be 
second-guessed absent evidence of some objective shortcoming.  Baldwin, 145 Idaho 
at 154, 177 P.3d at 368.  Far from manifesting an objective shortcoming, there are good 
tactical reasons for choosing not to pursue the particular line of questioning:  As noted 
above, trial counsel intended to attack Ms. Bowdoin’s credibility by calling witnesses to 
testify that she had stolen some of Sallings’ property.  Under the district court’s ruling, 
and under Rule 608(b), that preferred strategy was foreclosed.  While trial counsel could 
ask Ms. Bowdoin whether she had stolen some of Sallings’ property while he was 
incarcerated, under the ruling (and the rules of evidence), trial counsel could not put on 
evidence to contradict Ms. Bowdoin if she denied the theft.  All trial counsel could do 
was elicit an answer, and then accept whatever answer Ms. Bowdoin offered.  Under 
those circumstances, that trial counsel chose not to pursue that line of questioning 
shows a strategic decision, not deficient performance.   
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Moreover, Sallings has failed to present any evidence showing that he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to engage the specific line of questioning during 
his cross-examination of Ms. Bowdoin.  Sallings has not alleged, nor could he, that 
asking Ms. Bowdoin whether she had stolen some of Sallings’ property while he was 
incarcerated would have elicited any definite response.  Sallings cannot show that 
whatever response Ms. Bowdoin may have given would have diminished, as opposed to 
enhanced, her credibility.  Finally, even if Ms. Bowdoin’s credibility were at issue, the 
state’s case did not hinge on Ms. Bowdoin’s sterling reputation.  To the contrary, central 
to that case was the fact that Ms. Bowdoin had been a drug user and was working off a 
felony as a confidential informant.  (See 42424 Trial Tr., p.110, L.1 – p.111, L.19; p.164, 
L.2 – p.165, L.15.)  Having failed to present evidence showing prejudice, Sallings’ 
cannot show that his attorney was ineffective. 
Sallings has failed to show that trial counsel is required to impeach a witness in 
any particular manner, much less in the manner which he, in hindsight, believes his trial 
counsel should have employed.  “The constitutional requirement for effective assistance 
of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long series 
of examples of how the case might have been tried better.”  Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 
80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).  The strategic decisions of Sallings’ trial counsel during 
cross-examination do not constitute deficient performance.  Sallings failed to make a 
prima facie showing of deficient performance to support his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Sallings failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice to 
support his claim.  Because Sallings failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel, the district court correctly granted the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal.  The district court’s order should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing Sallings’ petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 27th day of February, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_______ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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